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Critiquing Debate
James P. Dimock
Debaters enjoy debating more than debate itself. The closer one gets to becoming ―an old debater‖ (a category to which I will inevitably have to resign
myself sooner or later), the more likely we are to find ourselves debating on the
side of ―the way debate used to be‖ or ―the way debate is supposed to be.‖ I
don‘t malign this seemly inevitable progression or even my place in it. I think
the tendency to re-examine ourselves says something about our activity.
I enter this debate about debate, I think I should begin by defining my side
of the flow, or to at least identify which side of the flow I am attacking. My purpose is not to condemn debating or to defend the good old days of debate. Rather I hope to engage in a critique of the activity. Debaters are familiar with critique, often spelled with a ―k,‖ as an attack upon the philosophical or ideological
assumptions of the opponent‘s argument but critiques exist outside the world of
debate as well and their purpose is not merely to win arguments. Critique, as
Ingram and Simon-Ingram (1992) noted, aims ―at emancipating … addresses
from ideology‖ (p. xxviii) and McKerrow (1989) argued the practice of critical
rhetoric is ―to unmask or demystify the discourse of power‖ and ―to understand
the integration of power/knowledge in society‖ (p. 91). My critique is concerned
not with what is good or bad debating, but with how debate constructs ―a particular vision of the world‖ and the ―forms of power … embraced or implicated‖
(McKerrow, 2001, p. 621) by the activity. Specifically, the focus of my effort is
on the practice of competitive debating, in particular how debate practices control and organize knowledge in fundamentally undemocratic ways.
That debate should lend itself to undemocratic ideology is ironic. The activity of debate has long been justified and defended on the grounds of its democratic-ness. Advocates of debate, at both the high school and collegiate level,
have grounded their support for the activity on its capacity to train students in
the skills necessary for citizenship in a democratic society. Freely (1996) contended that, ―Society benefits if debate is encouraged, both because free and
open debate protects the rights of individuals and because debate offers society a
way of reaching optimal decisions‖ (p. 6). The connection between participation
in debate and democracy is a core assumption of debate coaches and forensic
educators. In Mitchell‘s (1998) words, the connection between democracy and
debate is a ―faith inscribed in the American Forensic Association‘s Credo, reproduced in scores of argumentation textbooks, and rehearsed over and over
again in introductory argumentation courses‖ (para. 2). The advocates of debate
support the link between debate and participation in a democratic society. Muir
(1993), for example, has claimed:
… debate involves certain skills, including research and policy evaluation,
that evolve along with the debater‘s consciousness of the complexities of
moral and political dilemmas. This conceptual development is a basis for
the formation of ideas and relational thinking necessary for effective public
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decision making, making even the game of debate a significant benefit in
solving real world problems. (p. 287)

The advocates of contest debating assume almost categorically that debating
teaches students to question assumptions, think critically and research positions—all keys to arguing effectively. If we take as a given the premise that a
democratic society depends upon argument and, second, that debate provides
students with instruction in the art of argumentation, then it is reasonable to conclude debate should be valued by and fostered in a democratic society. Such
reasoning holds, however, only insofar as we can reasonably assume all argument is equally democratic. If the assumption doesn‘t hold, however, then undemocratic argumentation must be distinguished from the democratic. Thus, the
purpose of my critique.
I believe two aspects of contest debating run counter to the democratic
goals of the activity: concision and the unqualified obedience to authority; each
aspect addressed in turn.
Concision
One of the most anti-critical dimensions of debating is the structural imposition of concision upon argumentation. I borrow the concept from Noam
Chomsky who identified concision as a property of the propaganda model of the
media. The model posits that the mass-media filters news and information in
order to marginalize dissent and protect moneyed and powerful interests. In the
context of mass-media, ―concision means you have to be able to say things between two commercials‖ (Chomsky, 2002, p. 387). Concision as a structural
constraint ―imposes conformism in a very deep way because if you have to meet
the condition of concision, you can only either repeat conventional platitudes or
else you sound like you are from Neptune‖ (p. 387). If a person says, for example, that Iran sponsors terrorism, the claim sounds perfectly reasonable and the
speaker is simply repeating a position said over and over again. Thus, little if
any evidence is required to back up the claim. The claim can be made concisely.
Suppose, however, the speaker was to make an unconventional claim by stating
the United States sponsors terrorism. Under such conditions, Chomsky contended, people have a right to demand evidence in support of that claim.
Chomsky explained the dilemma:
This structural requirement of concision that‘s imposed by our media disallows the possibility of explanation; in fact, that‘s its propaganda function. It
means that you can repeat conventional platitudes, but you can‘t say anything out of the ordinary without sounding as if you‘re from Neptune, a
wacko, because to explain what you meant—and people have a right to ask
if it‘s an unconventional thought—would take a bit of time. (p. 387)
One only need watch television news pundits like Bill O‘Reilly to see the
concision principle in action: the more the guests‘ opinions differ from the host,
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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the less they are allowed to speak. Even those who do get to talk at length are
getting only a minute or two to explain themselves. Only those who are able to
express simple ideas that require little or no supporting analysis or evidence are
able to get their point across clearly. The further outside the mainstream an idea
is, the more likely the guest will sound like someone ―from Neptune.‖ Intentional or not, Chomsky concluded, concision is ―highly functional to impose thought
control‖ (p. 387). It makes it very difficult to challenge established political
dogmas and makes it easy to ridicule those who do.
Experts on debating and argumentation have derided the impact of concision on other forms of debating. The first broadcast political debate in the United States, a presidential primary debate between Thomas Dewey and Harold
Stassen, lasted for an hour with each candidate being given twenty minutes for
his opening statement and eight and a half minute for rebuttals. The debate was
on a single topic: whether or not the communist Party should be outlawed. In his
analysis of the debate, Kane (1987) suggested the debate had a meaningful impact on the Oregon State Primary after which Dewey‘s failing campaign was
―resurrected‖ and Stassen‘s ―was all but finished‖ (p. 252). Since then, however,
the political campaign debates have gotten considerably shorter. Kennedy and
Nixon had only eight-minute opening statements followed by two-and-a-half
minute responses to questions. In the 2004 Presidential debates between George
Bush and John Kerry, the time allotted per question was only two minutes.
While the length of time for the debates permits the covering of many subjects,
nothing can be covered in any depth. The format for debates in presidential
campaigns has been tinkered with many times over the years but, as Kane observed, ―No degree of tampering … will compensate for the basic inadequacy
that one cannot develop a meaningful position in a very few minutes‖ (p. 250).
Debates may influence voters, yet scholars of argumentation and debating have
been negative in their assessment of the quality of these ―debates.‖ The debates
are certainly not critical in the sense I am using the term here nor could they be
so constrained by concision.
This principle of concision is also at work in contest debating. Time constraints ensure argumentation is limited and that conventional points of view
will dominate the debate. Positions firmly within the mainstream require only
the sparsest analysis and scantest evidence. The quality or depth of support is
hardly at issue since the position is presumed already. Opposition, on the other
hand, requires considerable support and is subjected to intense scrutiny. A debater need only suggest Iran has no right to arm itself with nuclear weapons, but
considerable resources would be required to support the contention that the Unites States has no right to their weapons.
Concision is not simply a byproduct of the time constraints imposed on
speakers; after all, we must be some reasonable time limits both to ensure that
the debate is fair (both sides get equal amounts of time) and that the debate tournament is manageable (you can‘t schedule multiple rounds of competition unless
you have some sense of how long each round will be). Placing limits on time is
perfectly reasonable. We should observe, however, how short time limits are
given the complexity of the issues considered. Even a simple question of policy
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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must consider reasons for changing policy (harms and inherency), the nature of
the change to be made (plan) and the grounds for expecting positive change in
conditions (solvency). The complexity of topics debated has increase dramatically since formal intercollegiate debating began, yet time limits have changed
little. The topic of the first National Debate Tournament in 1947 was ―Resolved:
That labor should be given a direct share in the management of industry‖ (National Debate Tournament, n.d. ―Anticipating,‖ para. 10). In 2008 - 2009, debaters will consider:
Resolved: that the United States Federal Government should substantially
reduce its agricultural support, at least eliminating nearly all of the domestic
subsidies, for biofuels, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, corn, cotton, dairy, fisheries, rice, soybeans, sugar and/or wheat. (NDT, n.d. ―Topics,‖ para. 1)
As the complexity of the topic increases, the inherent complexity of policy
questions increases exponentially. Yet the time permitted to address complexity
has not.
As complexity of topics increases, so too does the need for concision. More
issues means the time dedicated to each issue is less. Good debaters are at least
tacitly aware of this condition and use it to their competitive advantage, wherever possible taking the stance most likely to have little need of rigorous advocacy.
Such positions are likely to favor the existing structure and current political
dogmas. Change can be advocated, but the basic structure and assumptions of
the status quo are not challenged. To extend a metaphor used by radicals (see,
for example Friedberg, 2007), it‘s permissible to rearrange who gets how much
of the pie, as long as the baker remains the same.
The pedagogical foundations of debating, assume that students engage in
the activity in order to develop skills conducive to their participation in a democratic society as informed and engaged citizens. Debating should habituate students to questioning assumptions and demanding that claims be justified on the
basis of accurate information and sound reasoning. Debaters conditioned upon
concision as both a structural constraint and a strategic necessity, however, inculcate blind spots and constrain thought. Debaters trained to argue within the
status quo but not to challenge its basic assumptions might well be more dangerous to the cause of genuine democracy than had they had no such training at
all. Those who have had no training are, at least, not brainwashed into believing
they have reached the limits of what can be argued.
Obedience to Authority
Since Aristotle, scholars of argumentation have identified different types of
arguments debaters might use in defense or refutation of a given claim. How
those types of argument are delineated depends upon the person making the
classifications. We generally recognize arguments can be divided into two distinctly different classes. Aristotle (1946) distinguished between artistic proofs
(ethos, pathos and logos) and inartistic proofs (―witnesses, evidence given under
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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torture, written contracts, and so on‖) (p. 1355b). Rhetorician Richard M. Weaver (1974) classified arguments as ―‗internal‘ in the sense that they involve our
own interpretation of experience‖ and ―‗external‘ sources‖ of argument ―which
utilize the interpretation of others‖ (p. 144). External arguments, in the simplest
form, involve citation of authorities or the quoting of witness testimony. I, for
example, could have made the distinction between internal and external arguments based upon my own understanding of the structure of arguments. Instead,
however, I invoked Weaver and Aristotle as authorities in order to make my
argument. The basic structure of the argument from authority can be seen in
Figure 1.
Figure 1

The syllogism makes apparent such arguments ―have no intrinsic force;
whatever persuasive power they carry is derived from the credit of the testifier
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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or the weight of the authority‖ (Weaver, 1974, p. 146). The lack of intrinsic
force does not mean, however, that arguments from authority and testimony are
not legitimate forms of argument. Rather, it means such arguments depend upon
the credibility of the witness or expert which lie outside the argument, thus they
are called external arguments.
Even the best arguers will often base claims upon authority and it is certainly true that critical thinkers, speakers, and writers cite sources of their information (Dimock, Treinen, Cronn-Mills & Jersak, 2008). It is important, however,
to avoid obfuscating the distinction between citing sources and the argument
from authority as a distinct mode of argument.
Figure 2
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Figure 3

The arguments in Figures 1 and 2 are both based on Toulmin‘s (1964) model of argument but I have modified them slightly to highlight the distinction between citing sources and arguing from authority. In Figure 1, the argument is
supported by authority in order to establish key facts or concepts but the argument itself stands on the strength of the arguer‘s inference, the conclusion drawn
from those facts and concepts. The argument from authority, as seen in Figure 2,
is distinctly different. Therein, the conclusion is sustained entirely by authority.
The data (where Steven was born) and the warrant (who is a British subject under British law) are presumably there but they are in the mind of the expert. As
auditors we are not privy to the data used, the concepts that provide the warrant;
only the conclusion and the assurance (which is often enthymematic) that we
should take his or her word for it.
I think it is important to stress nothing inherently wrong with the argument
from authority. Authority is especially valuable to arguers who are unable to
ground arguments in their own experience (just because I have never been to
Iraq doesn‘t mean I should be disqualified from arguing about the Iraq War),
provide arguers with perfectly reasonable shortcuts (it is easier and more reasonable to defer to experts on legal questions than research all of the statutes and
relevant case law on my own). Indeed, in some cases the conclusions of respected authorities and experts should trump those of the inexpert. If I choke on
biscotti at my favorite coffee shop, the only opinions I am interested in are those
of persons who are trained in the Heimlich maneuver. No one else‘s opinion
matters.
In such cases, the argument from authority can be qualified. If we draw
upon the testimony of those who have been to Iraq when we have not been there
for ourselves, we would look at the quality of that testimony: How many witnesses do we ground our argument upon? What is the range of the witnesses‘
experience? Are the witnesses reliable and credible? When we allow experts to
synthesize information and ideas for us, as in the case of legal scholarship we
ask different questions: Is the expert qualified? Is the opinion rendered within
the expert‘s field of experience and training? Does he or she have the support of
other experts within the field? Does he or she have any agenda which might call
into question his or her conclusions? Finally, with respect to technical processes
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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or procedures, we can qualify the technician: Where and how was the technician
trained? How much experience does he or she have?
Arguments from authority are an important component in the arguer‘s toolbox. It is important that we, as scholars of argumentation, understand the principles and limits of authority as a mode of argument. Unfortunately, however,
scholars of argument have tended to pay little attention to the argument from
authority. Neglect of the argument from authority begins with Aristotle (1946)
who chose to ignore the ‗inartistic proofs‘ and concentrate upon those proofs
―such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric‖ (p.
1355b). In the Enlightenment, the argument from authority was considered a
fallacious ―reluctance to challenge authorities that are learned, eminent or powerful‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162). The philosopher John Locke called arguments
from authority ―argumentum ad verecundiam,‖ and dismissed as fallacious the
invocation not only of ―worthless authorities‖ but also those ―worthy authorities,
whom it is normally reasonable to trust, maybe wrong‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162).
Contemporary scholars have continued to marginalize the argument from authority. For example, in what might be the most extensive treatment of argumentation and argumentation theory in recent years, van Eemeren and his colleagues
(1996) invest almost nothing in the subject of the argumentation from authority
continuing to favor other modes of inference and reasoning. But if scholars have
been dismissive of the argument from authority, debaters have embraced it
whole heartedly.
Freeley‘s Argumentation and Debate has been a standard in the discipline
for more than 40 years and the textbook is noted for being principally a work on
debate rather than argumentation theory (Hostettler, 1961; Bjork, 1994). Thus
Argumentation and Debate is a good indicator of what is valued by instructors of debate as opposed to those who emphasize argumentation. Now in its
11th edition, Freeley and Steinberg (2005) have dedicated chapters to the structure of arguments (Chapter 8), the types of arguments (Chapter 9), and fallacies
(Chapter 10). Balancing this treatment of argumentation, three chapters are dedicated to evidence wherein Freeley and Steinberg‘s treat such topics as the location of sources, reading critically, types of evidence, tests of evidence, and other
dimensions of the argument from authority. As much weight is placed upon the
argument from authority as is given to all other modes and types of arguments
combined. Clearly, Freeley and Steinberg give considerably more attention to
the argument from authority than van Eemeren et al. give the topic.
I do not wish to suggest that I have conducted a systematic investigation of
argumentation or debate textbooks. I believe, however, the difference between
Freeley and Steinberg‘s attention to testimonial and authoritative evidence and
that given by van Eemeren et al. is indicative of the different treatment given the
subject of authority is given in the two arenas. In argumentation studies, the subject is given little attention and clearly marginalized as a form of argument while
in debate it is prioritized. Argumentation scholars may unfairly exclude the argument from authority but within the sphere of interscholastic and intercolleSpeaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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giate debate, the argument from authority is not merely a mode of argument; it is
the primary mode of argument.
All arguers probably make use of the argument from authority to some extent or another and using such arguments is perfectly reasonable. My concern
here and what I believe should concern all of us who think debate should be
grounded in a democratic pedagogy is the overreliance on the argument from
authority to the exclusion of other modes of argument.
Arguments from authority have a presumptive status in competitive debate.
If a debater must choose between the use of authority and any other mode of
argument, debaters will pick the argument from authority opting other forms of
argument only when the option to cite evidence is not available. The opponent‘s
rebuttal will predictably be that, although the argument might be cogent, there
was ―no evidence.‖ When evidence clashes with any other form of argument,
evidence wins and debaters know it. As coaches and judges we reinforce it.
I think the reliance upon a single mode of argument is unquestionably uncritical, like a carpenter who might have had some theoretical training in the use
of tools but who really only uses a hammer. Certainly, the hammer is a useful
tool and necessary for some tasks but I would have a hard time calling anyone a
master carpenter who did not also have a working knowledge of the saw, the
screwdriver, and a host of other essential tools. In the same way, we cannot justly claim to be teaching argumentation when in truth we are only teaching one
type of argument, even if we are teaching it very well.
This prioritization of one mode of argument at the expense of all others is
more than just educationally unsound, it is also uncritical. Rhetorician Richard
Weaver (1953) said that how a person argues ―tells us how he is thinking about
the world‖ (p. 55) and is thus ―a truer index of his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles‖ (p. 58). Weaver concluded that those who prefer the argument from definition, as he did, tended toward conservatism while those who
argued from circumstance were liberal. Extending that position, I contend that
those who favor the argument from authority are not necessarily conservative or
liberal but technocratic.
Democracy assumes people are able to understand social, political, and economic questions, to weigh evidence, and make reasoned decisions. Conversely,
technocracy (as I am using the term herein) assumes that people are generally
incapable of understanding, analysis, and reasoned decision-making on such
issues.
Noam Chomsky (2006) offered an example of the distinction between democratic and technocratic thinking. Chomsky noted that although he is perhaps
most well-known for his political and social commentary, he is education and
expertise is in the field of linguistics. His critics have often used this fact against
him, suggesting that he is unqualified to render commentary on matters of public
policy and international relations. Chomsky‘s response is that such criticism is
not only irrelevant but indicative of an undemocratic mindset. ―The alleged
complexity, depth and obscurity‖ of political and social questions are:

Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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…part of the illusion propagated by the system of ideological control
which aims to make these issues seem remote from the general population and to persuade them of their incapacity to organized their own affairs or to understand the social world in which they live without the tutelage of intermediaries. (p. 70)

The insistence upon authority to validate claims raised in the political sphere
precludes ordinary citizens from voicing their beliefs on political questions removing them from the political process. It effectively domesticates the demos
and excludes them from the political sphere. The citizen is positioned outside
the political discourse, assigned the role of passive observer while participation
is left to experts.
Debaters are not to analyze issues for themselves or exercise what Chomsky
called their own ―Cartesian common sense‖ which he believed required little
more than ―willingness to look at the facts with an open mind, to put simple
assumptions to the test, and to pursue an argument to its conclusion‖ (Chomsky,
2006, p. 70). Instead, debaters are required to cite experts, to make not their own
judgments but to discover those of qualified others and recite them at the prescribed moment.
Ultimately, privileging authority is incompatible with the critical perspective. The obedience to authority, the assumptions that for every question there is
an expert who can provide the answer, and ordinary people are not competent to
discuss policy options without appeal to those who have the ‗right‘ kind of
knowledge: these are the core premises of technocratic thinking. I would contend, no great step is required to move from the position that experts alone have
the right to draw conclusions about policy questions to the position that experts
should be the ones making policy decisions. There is simply nothing democratic
about that.
Conclusion
The problems posed by concision and the overemphasis of the argumentation from authority are interrelated concerns. The problem of concision is exacerbated by overly-broad topics. So is the problem of overreliance on authority.
As Ziegemuller (1996) noted ―although there was, over the years, some gradual
increase in the amount of evidence used by debaters at the NDT, the rapid expansion in the quantity of evidence used largely coincided with the adoption of
… broad topics‖ (para. 8). As topics become unmanageably broad, it makes it
difficult for debaters to develop their own sense of the ideas or to explore them
in depth. Unable to make personal judgments upon the issues, debaters are
forced to rely upon the judgments of others.
Debaters who use the argument from authority are also able to argue more
concisely than those who develop other modes of analysis. One need only return
to Figure 2 and Figure 3 to see which is more concise. Furthermore, the argument from authority aggravates the uncritical nature of concision. Concision
favors dominant opinions and current political dogma which are repeated over
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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and over again in the media. It is thus far easier to find evidence to support
mainstream viewpoints and perspectives. Constrained by concision, authorities
whose conclusions are too far outside the mainstream must be quoted at greater
length in order to make their claims appear rational. Debaters who keep their
positions within the very narrow range of the dominant paradigm have a considerable tactical advantage over those who attempt to argue from outside that
paradigm.
Concision and the overreliance on authority are practices which make it
very difficult to challenge the dominant paradigm. Because they reinforce the
dominant ideology, which has tended to favor some groups (white, male,
straight, Christian, Western, elites, etc.) while marginalizing others (people of
color, women, GLBT, non-Christian, non-Western, poor, etc.). For a long time,
we have justified our activity on the grounds that it prepares young people for
leadership. But what kinds of leaders will they be? Whether they move on to
take roles in government, industry and finance or even the academy, will they be
the kind of leaders who are instilled with a respect for democracy? Debate, as it
is currently practiced, is designed to produce technocratic elites not democratic
citizens.
In our civic culture, individuals are feeling more and more distant from the
processes of democracy. Zinn (1997) has noted, for example, that ―surveys since
the early seventies show that 70 to 80 percent of Americans are distrustful of
government, business an the military‖ (p. 474). An even stronger indicator of
people‘s alienation from the political process is the low voter turnout, especially
among the most disenfranchised segments of the population. The Census Bureau
reported that in 2004 voter turnout was up but still only 64 percent and rates
were lower among those who are the most marginalized in the status quo: racial
minorities, the poor and the youth (Faler, 2005). Voter turnout rates are dismal
but the rates of actual participation in politics have been pathetic. While there
was an upsurge of participation in 2008, whether this is the beginning of trend or
an anomaly remains to be seen. We can conclude, however, that a democratic
society is not possible without citizens who see themselves as empowered
agents of action capable of understanding issues and making reasoned decisions.
We cannot train leaders to do not believe that ordinary people are capable of
understanding issues and making reasoned decisions and expect democracy to
flourish or even survive.
I debated throughout high school and college. I don‘t write this critique because I hate debate or resent debaters. I genuinely believe that no activity has
done more for me intellectually than debate. I am convinced that it is an empowering activity and I believe thousands of others like me are proof of that.But as
a critical scholar, I cannot come to the conclusion that debate is personally empowering and stop there. I cannot accept the conclusion that debating develops
critical thinkers but not critically-minded citizens and believe we are doing good
enough. I don‘t believe debate has failed. I believe debate has failed to take the
next step.
We can improve the critical capacity of debating and transform the activity
into a truly critical education:
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)
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1. We need to fight concision and allow for arguments and positions to be fully
considered. This means we need to extend time limits and to ask narrower
questions. We simply cannot expect anyone to explain what is wrong with
the Horn of Africa and how to fix it in less than ten minutes.
2. We need to value alternative modes of argument and not just as off-beat kritiks offered as merely another way to try and win the ballot. Thus, we need to
stop being just judges of debate and start becoming scholars and students of
argumentation. Arbitrary changes to the rules have been tried and have failed
because we have continued to think of ourselves as debaters rather than as
arguers and judges of debates rather than as teachers of argument.
3. We need to start taking our mission seriously. Debate is a game but like any
good game its purpose is to instruct and to instill values. If we truly believe
we are preparing students for leadership in a democracy and that our activity
exists in order to strengthen the foundation of a free society, we should start
acting like those values matter.
References
Aristotle. (1946). Rhetorica. (W. R. Roberts, Trans.). London: Oxford University Press. (Original work published circa 322 BCE)
Bagdikian, B. H. (2000). The media monopoly (6th ed.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Battelle, J. (2005). The search : How Google and its rivals rewrote the rules of
business and transformed our culture. New York: Penguin Group
Bjork, R. S. (1994). Argument: Theory and practice [Review of the book Argumentation and Debate]. Argumentation & Advocacy, 31(1), 47 – 49.
Chomsky, N. (2002). Chomsky on Democracy and Education (C. Otero, Ed.).
New York: Routledge.
Chomsky, N. (2006). Politics. In N. Chomsky and M. Foucault, The ChomskyFoucault debate on human nature (pp. 68 – 116). New York: The New
Press.
Dimock, J. P., Treinen, K., Cronn-Mills, D. & Jersak, R. (2008). Infusing critical
thinking into communication courses. Communication and Theater Association of Minnesota Journal, 35, 47 – 68.
van Eemeren, F. H., et al. (1996). Fundamentals of argument theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments.
Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Faler, B. (2005, May 26). Census details voter turnout for 2004. The Washington
Post, p. A10.
Freeley, A. J. (1996). Argumentation and debate: Critical thinking for reasoned
decision making. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, Inc.
Freeley, A. J. & Steinberg, D. L. (2005). Argumentation and debate: Critical
thinking for reasoned decision making (11th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, Inc.
Friedbert, L. M. (2007). To hell with a bigger piece of the pie, we want the
whole fucking bakery! Culture Kitchen.
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)

http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/8

www.dsr-tka.org/

12

Dimock: Critiquing Debate
Speaker & Gavel 2009

93

http://www.culturekitchen.com/lilian_m_friedberg/story/to_hell_with_
a_bigger_piece_of_the_
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hostettler, G. F. (1961). Argumentation and debate [Review of the book Argumentation and Debate]. Quarterly Journal of Speech 47(3), 327.
Ingram, D. & Simon-Ingram, J. (Eds.). (1992). Critical theory: The essential
readings. New York: Paragon House.
Kane, T. (1987). The Dewey-Stassen primary debate of 1948: An examination
of format for presidential debates. In J. W. Wenzel (Ed.), Argument and
critical practices: Proceedings of the fifth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 249 – 253). Annandale VA: Speech Communication
Association.
McKerrow, R. E. (1989). Critical rhetoric: Theory and praxis. Communication
Monographs 56(2), 91 – 111.
McKerrow, R. (2001). Critical rhetoric. In T. O. Sloane (Ed.). Encyclopedia of
rhetoric (pp. 619 – 622). New York: Oxford University Press.
Mitchell, G. (1998). Pedagogical possibilities for argumentative agency in academic debate. Argumentation & Advocacy 35(2), 41 – 61.
Muir, S. (1993). A defense of the ethics of contemporary debate. Philosophy &
Rhetoric 26(4), 277 – 295.
National Debate Tournament. (n.d.). Anticipating West Point. Retrieved October
25, 2005 from http://groups.wfu.edu/NDT/Articles/ndtart1.html.
National Debate Tournament. (n.d.). 2008 – 2009 intercollegiate debate topic.
Retrieved September 3, 2008 from
http://groups.wfu.edu/NDT/Topic.html.
Nichols, J. & McChesney, R. W. (2009, April 6). The death and life of great
American newspapers. The Nation Online.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090406/nichols_mcchesney
Toulmin, S. E. (1964). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Weaver, R. M. (1953). The ethics of rhetoric. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.
Weaver, R. M. (1974). A rhetoric and composition handbook. New York: Quill.
Ziegelmueller, G. (1996). The National Debate Tournament: Through a halfcentury of argument. Argumentation & Advocacy, 32(3) 143 – 151.
Zinn, H. (1997). A people’s history of the United States (Teaching ed.). New
York: The New Press.

James P. Dimock is an assistant professor and the assistant director of
forensics at Minnesota State University, Mankato

Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009)

www.dsr-tka.org/

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2016
13

